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I. THE EMERGENCE OF ASIAN STOCK MARKETS
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A. Overview
Asian equity markets are sizable and fast growing. Since 1990, Asia's capitalization has more than doubled in U.S. dollar terms to $13.7 trillion, 30 percent of world capitalization. Excluding Japan and Australia, it has risen almost tenfold. The financial hubs of Hong Kong SAR, Singapore, and Japan dominate the region, accounting for two-thirds of Asian equity assets. Markets in some other countries, such as Malaysia, and Taiwan Province of China, are also sizable. But, for the most part, market capitalization remains well below industrial country levels.
The growth in Asian markets has been accompanied by improved liquidity and breadth. Since 1990 market liquidity (share turnover) has more than doubled in relation to GDP, while turnover velocity (share turnover/market capitalization) has risen almost fourfold. Market breadth (the percentage of market capitalization and turnover accounted for by the ten largest companies-a higher figure implies greater concentration) is now greater in Asia than in other emerging markets, although less than in industrial countries. 3 There is, however, considerable diversity within this broad picture. Equity markets in China and Indonesia remain illiquid and small relative to the size of their domestic economies, with growth trailing the rest of the region. Market liquidity is also low. In China, the nascent state of the equity market reflects the dominance of poorly performing state-owned companies, which account for about half of total market capitalization (McKinsey Global Institute, 2006a) . The majority of China's successful companies choose to list overseas, primarily in Hong Kong SAR. In Indonesia, the development of the stock market has been hindered by G-7 weaknesses in transparency, information disclosure policies, and corporate governance. Markets in the Philippines and Hong Kong SAR are dominated by relatively few firms. Markets such as Bhutan, which are outside the emerging-markets universe focused on by international investors, face unique challenges.
While Asian finance remains bank-dominated, stock markets are an important source of corporate finance (Table 3) . In 2005, companies in emerging Asia tapped equity markets for some $814 billion in new capital through initial and secondary public offerings (Table 1) . However, issuance activity is highly concentrated within the region: Hong Kong SAR accounted for almost half of total Asian issuance, with the next largest market (India) raising just over one-fifth of the total. Overall, equities provide around 10 percent of corporate financing in emerging Asia, but this compares favorably with 3.7 percent in emerging markets outside Asia. Equities are also a large share of financial assets in the region, accounting for about half of assets (deposits, stocks, and bonds) (Figures 3 and 4 and Table 2 ). Nevertheless, as a share of assets, equities generally have yet to recover to pre-Asian-crisis levels.
Equity derivatives have flourished in a few markets in Asia (Appendix I 4 Equity derivatives are mainly traded on organized exchanges rather than over the counter (OTC). Annual OTC equity trading in Asia is only around $100 billion (BIS, 2005) . Edison and Warnock (2003) to measure market openness) has trended upward since the early 1990s, consistent with equity market liberalization.
5 Qualified or foreign institutional investors are those that are registered and permitted by regulatory authorities to invest in a country's securities markets. They generally are supervised by regulators in home countries, and comprise pension, insurance and mutual funds, banks, and investment trusts. 1/ The numbers do not add to 100 percent because ownership by government, banks and corporates are omitted as they are generally longer-term holders and do not represent part of the free float. Nonresidents are free to purchase equity securities.
Nonresidents are free to purchase equity securities.
Foreign individuals and organizations are allowed to hold, in aggregate up to 30 percent of an issuer's listed current shares.
Nonresidents are free to purchase equity securities but investment in banks by nonresidents exceeding 10 percent requires regulatory approval.
Nonresidents are free to purchase equity securities. Investment in banks above set limits requires regulatory approval.
Nonresidents are free to purchase equity securities. Investment in banks by nonresidents is generally limited to 30 percent.
Nonresidents can invest in up to 100 percent of the equity capital of listed and unlisted public companies without prior approval, subject to certain exclusions and limitations. Equity investment by foreign participants subject to various restrictions.
QIIs are allowed to invest in A-shares subject to quotas. No QII may hold more than 10 percent of a listed company. In 2005 total aggregate quota was US$10 billion.
Nonresidents are free to purchase equity securities, except for financial companies. Nonresidents may not hold more than 1 percent of any investment fund.
FIIs are allowed to invest in shares subject to sectoral caps of 24 percent (insurance), 49 percent and 74 percent (airlines and banks) in certain sectors. No FII may hold more than 10 percent of a listed company.
Intraregional equity portfolio flows nearly tripled over 2001-04 to $113.6 billion. Today, intraregional flows account for over 15 percent of total inflows to countries in the region, up from just under 10 percent in 2001 (Table 6 ). However, these flows are derived from a relatively few countries (mainly the financial centers of Hong Kong SAR, Singapore and Japan). Furthermore, intraregional flows by some measures remain small relative to flows from Asia to the rest of the world. For example, Japan, one of the largest sources of portfolio flows in the region, channels about 7 percent of its external portfolio investment to Asia. Also, cross-listings within the region by and large remain modest (Box 1 
Box 1. Cross-Listings and Equity Market Integration in Asia
Cross-listing 1 can be thought of as a channel for individual companies to achieve integration with global capital markets. Investors can hold foreign equities easily via domestic exchanges. Issuers can benefit from an expanded shareholder base and lower risk premiums; access to more developed capital markets and lower cost of capital; increased liquidity; better information disclosure and coverage by analysts; and better corporate governance. 6 In some countries, a large share of such companies' assets is invested in equities. Nonetheless, the sector still holds major potential for growth, since it remains small relative to developed countries (U.S. institutional investors' assets comprise 160 percent of GDP; McKinsey Global Institute, 2006a and 2006b).
While institutional investors play large roles in some markets, in some cases structural barriers may hinder their participation. In China, Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Thailand, institutional investors' assets on average account for under 15 percent of GDP, less than a third of that in better-developed markets. The growth of institutional investors seems to have been constrained by several factors (Ghosh, 2006) :
Restrictions on the types of investments that can be made by insurance and pension companies (China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines require institutional assets to be invested in government securities or bank deposits);
• Competition from government guaranteed savings schemes (e.g., India's small savings schemes);
• Crowding out by public defined benefit pension plans (Korea, Philippines, and Thailand);
• Legislative hurdles (e.g., outdated legislation hinders mutual fund development in the Philippines); and (Vittas, 2005) and 29 percent in the Philippines.
The removal of controls on mutual fund activities has also aided market development. In India, private competition was introduced into the mutual fund market in 1987, and foreign entry was first permitted in 1993. In Japan, Japan Post and private banks have recently been allowed to sell investment trusts to the public, and Korea has announced its long-term vision to become a regional financial hub with special expertise in asset management.
Improvements in Market Infrastructure and Governance
Efforts over the past decade have resulted in the region having some of the most technically efficient markets in the world (Table 7) and have also improved corporate governance. On the technical side, most countries in the region have developed electronic clearing and settlement systems. Steps have also been under way to enhance corporate transparency and to adopt global accounting and disclosure standards-which is important because corporate governance figures prominently in investment decisions. 7 Formally, the rules and regulations governing corporate governance across the region are in general quite strong. That said, while there is little variation across Asian economies in (for example) legal rights of shareholders, there are differences in the requirements on disclosure and transparency and board responsibilities (Cheung and Jang, 2005 Surveys of investor perceptions suggest that still significant differences remain within the region in the implementation of corporate governance laws (Cheung and Jang 2005 
II. PERFORMANCE OF ASIAN EMERGING STOCK MARKETS
This section examines three aspects of Asian emerging-market equity performance over recent years. First, it examines price performance relative to other markets, and considers some possible drivers. Second, it looks at recent trends in volatility and the possible relationship with capital account liberalization. Third, it explores correlations with global and regional markets, to provide a perspective on the integration of Asian markets with other equity markets.
A. Price Performance
Over the past five years, Asian emerging markets 9 have outperformed mature markets but lagged other emerging markets. Overall, stock prices generally remain well below pre-Asia-crisis peaks, whereas equity indices in Latin America, emerging Europe, and the Middle East exceed their 1990s highs (perhaps boosted by higher commodity prices or expectation of EU accession).
The run-up in Asian stock prices has reflected a period of good economic fundamentals in the region. Economic growth has been strong in a number of countries, in the context of a robust global expansion, notwithstanding periodic spikes in oil prices. Moreover, corporate profits have been solid.
Rising Asian stock prices have also coincided with a period of low U.S. interest rates. U.S. interest rates affect Asian equities in part through portfolio choices of global investors; 8 The Asian Corporate Governance Foundation (2005) suggests that measures could include simple steps such as ensuring that board directors have appropriate backgrounds and training to be effective, and giving sufficient advance notice of the dates and topics of shareholder meetings. they provide a benchmark safe return for global investors and are used to discount future cash flows from equities. 10 In addition, higher U.S. rates sometimes coincide with moves by global investors toward more defensive postures, sending riskier assets such as emerging Asian equities lower. As a third channel, changes in the U.S. monetary stance may signal a turning point in the U.S. economy, with potential implications for growth in its trading partners. Indeed, turning points in Asian equity prices do seem to correspond, albeit rather loosely, to shifts in U.S. short-term rates.
Amid the stock market boom, Asian emerging market equity volatility has remained a few percentage points above the levels attained in the first half of the 1990s (although it is below the late 1990s level). Looking at country-specific data, however, the increase seems to be mostly limited to Indonesia and Taiwan Province of China, and to a lesser extent Korea; indeed, volatility is below pre-crisis levels in a few other markets. Higher volatility in some countries compared with the early 1990s could reflect the opening up of Asian markets to foreign investment, but evidence on this score is mixed. 11 In principle, the increase in openness means that Asian markets are more exposed to global volatility and shifts in investor sentiment, and thus could be more volatile. However, while openness has increased in the markets where volatility has risen, it has also increased in markets where volatility is basically unchanged, or lower. Moreover, empirical research has not found clear evidence that liberalization increases volatility. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) find a small but generally insignificant increase in stock market volatility after capital market liberalization. Using pre-1996 data, Holmes and Wong (2001) found that liberalization lowered volatility, or did not raise it, in Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan Province of China. Hargis (2002) , De Santis and Imrohoroglu (1997), and Claessens (1995) report similar finding for emerging markets in Latin America and Asia.
Overall, no systematic trend in volatility related to market opening seems to be evident.
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That said, the changes in volatility in selected Asian markets-as well as the contrast with developments in other emerging markets-remain to be explained.
B. Correlation with Global and Regional Markets
Asian equity markets have become more synchronized with global markets since the early 1990s. The same is true for emerging markets as a group, suggesting that globally rising integration may be at play. Indeed, Asia's correlation with developed markets has moved closely with the overall emerging markets correlation. Correlations have also risen significantly for individual Asian countries, in some cases quite dramatically. The Asian market "beta" versus world markets has also increased over time. In a standard, single factor capital asset pricing model, the "beta"-essentially the slope in a regression of the local market return on global market returns-is the appropriate measure of risk. In particular, it is the risk-and hence the expected return-associated with exposure to the overall (world) market. Notably, the beta for the S&P/IFC global index has risen by more than that for the investable index. This is consistent with the idea that rising market integration could be lifting return correlations. In particular, as the share of internationally tradable stocks in the global index rises, the share held in global portfolios should rise, and thus its exposure to global market developments should increase.
Box 4.1 of the September 2006 Asia and Pacific Regional Economic
Outlook finds that capital flows in emerging Asia have become more volatile in absolute terms, although it also finds that this has not necessarily resulted in greater vulnerability. 13 Correlations with global markets are volatile, so caution is needed in imputing trends. Some changes in correlation seem to be related to economic events. Emerging Asia's correlation declined sharply during Asian crisis when the impact weighed more heavily on Asian than mature markets; and other breaks may coincide with turning points of the global interest rate cycle, for example during the early 1990s. By and large, however, shifts in correlation are hard to identify with specific events. The uptrend in correlation and beta vis-à-vis global markets could reflect increased liberalization, but, as is the findings on volatility, the literature on this score is mixed. For example, Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2005) do not find evidence for an uptrend in return correlations, but also note that many studies find different results, in part because correlations are unstable over time (as shown in Longin and Olnik, 1995) . In addition, Bekaert and Harvey (1995) suggest that even if greater integration increases the correlation of returns across countries, time variation in the degree of market integration could complicate the empirical relationship of asset prices, market liberalization, and market integration, making it difficult to attribute rising correlation directly to liberalization.
III. ARE ASIAN MARKETS OVERHEATING?
An examination of valuation measures and risk-adjusted performance can shed light on whether Asian markets may have become overheated. Measures such as price-earnings (PE) ratios (here, based on historical earnings) and dividend yields provide some sense of whether prices are broadly in line with the relevant underlying cashflows. Measures of risk-adjusted performance can help in gauging whether recent market performance has been unusual (if, for example, it is very high relative to comparator markets). similarly moderate, by and large. That said, a few markets (India, Sri Lanka) have valuations that are somewhat above recent averages.
The expected real dividend growth implied by current valuations also appears to be generally in line with medium-term GDP growth forecasts. A deeper look at valuations compares expected real dividend growth extracted from dividend yields with GDP growth as a simple benchmark. Heuristically, dividends should grow basically in line with GDP, if in the long run corporate earnings are stable as a share of GDP and dividends are stable as a share of earnings. Using the Gordon model to extract implied growth in real dividends and comparing it with real GDP forecasts from the WEO (Table 13 ) under various assumptions, 14 in only a few instances (assuming high risk premiums) do equity-market valuations imply levels of dividend growth that are out of line with medium-term WEO projections. Even in these cases, they are not grossly above WEO growth projections.
Ex-post risk-adjusted returns in EM equity investments also do not suggest that markets are overheated. Based on the Sharpe ratio, which measures excess returns per unit of risk (volatility, as measured by the standard deviation), Asian risk-adjusted returns have been basically in line with those in emerging markets in other regions, as well as U.S. high-yield bonds. This is consistent with analysis of excess returns (over a risk-free benchmark rate), 14 The analysis closely follows Box 2.2 of IMF (1999) . We use various assumptions on risk premiums and real interest rates to approximate the discount factor (the sum of the risk premium and real interest rate). The high risk premium scenario may be more relevant for less developed economies, and the low risk premium more relevant to more developed markets. Mehra and Prescott (1985) . 6/ 250 basis points are added to roughly reflect EMBI global spreads.
2/ Calculations are based on average data from January-June 2006 unless otherwise specified. Short rate refers to yields of 3-month government or central bank bills, and long rate refers to 10-year bond yields. As for U.S. rates, only the results with short rate are shown as the ones with long rates are very similar reflecting flat U.S. yield curve. which have been broadly similar to those in non-Asian emerging markets. As one important caveat, this does not provide definitive evidence, on its own, that Asian markets are not overheated-it cannot be ruled out that many markets are out of line with fundamentals. But along with the aforementioned valuation measures, it does provide some evidence that recent performance has not been grossly out of line with fundamentals.
To sum up, equity markets do not generally show signs of overheating. That said, some exploration of the relationship between equity prices and economic activity can provide some forward-looking perspective on the development of equity markets, and shed light on the attendant possible policy implications. The next section explores this issue.
IV. EQUITY PRICES AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
At one end of the spectrum, there is the "passive information theory" whereby asset prices and real activity are naturally correlated because stock prices reflect the present discounted value of expected future dividends (and expected future growth). From this perspective, equity prices are mere leading indicators of future changes in economic activity. Beyond this passive channel, however, there are four main channels whereby equity prices may affect real activity (Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny, 1990 ).
• Wealth effects: Under the life cycle/permanent income hypothesis higher asset prices raise individuals' lifetime wealth, leading to higher spending (potentially most significant in countries where stock ownership is prevalent among households).
• The financing or cost of capital hypothesis: Rising stock prices lower the cost of new capital relative to existing capital, spurring investment.
• The financial accelerator or credit channel: When credit markets are imperfect, asset price fluctuations can impact borrowing capacity by affecting borrowers' wealth and the value of assets pledged as collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999) . These dynamics affect the finance premium on loans, and thus influence investment and consumption. If borrowers are highly leveraged, changes in net worth arising from moves in asset prices can disproportionately impacts real variables, working to propagate and amplify macroeconomic shocks.
• Balance-sheet effects and financial fragility: Asset price swings affect financial institutions' net worth by affecting the valuation of asset portfolios, as well as the health of borrowers as noted above (thus potentially boosting nonperforming loans). Severe asset price crashes can cause intermediaries to cut back credit, potentially dampening aggregate demand. Large shocks can cause feedback into corporate and household income, further weakening intermediaries and prompting further asset price declines, especially when intermediaries are highly leveraged.
• Confidence effects: To the extent that equity prices signal faster growth of future real incomes, they can also influence consumption. Likewise, stock market changes may provide entrepreneurs with information about market expectations of future demand, thus influencing investment decisions.
Empirical research suggests that the financial wealth channel could be significant in Asia. In Japan and Australia-both of which have large stock markets and retail investor bases-the marginal propensity to consume from wealth is estimated at 2-3 percent and 7.4−14.5 percent, respectively (Slacalek, 2006) . However, Slacalek's estimates for Australia appear to be large particularly relative to those derived from other studies. For example, Dvornak and Kohler (2003) finds that the long-run wealth effect, including the housing and stock market effects, is 4 percent. Kuralbayeva and N'Diaye (2006) find that in Malaysia, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, and Korea, a 10 percent rise in real stock prices increases private consumption by about 0.2−0.3 percent, similar in magnitude to estimates for industrial countries (see IMF, 2000; and Slacalek, 2006) . As one caveat, using stock price indices to proxy household wealth may overstate wealth effects, because stock prices are leading indicators and because retail investment in some markets is low (Slacalek, 2006) .
The 1997 Asia crisis illustrates how financial accelerator effects can contribute to financial and economic volatility, although most of these effects occurred through real estate. Large capital inflows to Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia allowed financial intuitions to intermediate a large supply of funds to their credit constrained customers. This in turn drove up stock and property prices, raising the net worth of borrowers and easing their borrowing constraints and allowing them to become highly leveraged. In Thailand, for example, borrowers could fund up to 70-80 percent of the value of collateral, making borrowers vulnerable to asset price declines (Edison, Luangaram, and Miller, 2000) .
This analysis raises the question: how large are equity holdings in Asia? The answer can provide a perspective on the size of potential balance-sheet and accelerator effects in Asia. That said, a few caveats are in order before proceeding:
• Data are fragmentary at best, and may not fully or accurately reflect sectoral exposures in every case.
• Information on derivatives exposures is especially scant, and in particular information on net exposures in OTC markets to increased volatility and sharp market swings (see Appendix I).
• Indirect effects on the real economy through confidence and a worsening of corporate financing conditions can be important, as well as balance-sheet effects. In addition, financial institutions can experience indirect effects if equity price declines worsen borrowers' net worth and boost nonperforming loans. Moreover, a market downturn usually brings a decline in fee-based investment banking and asset management activities, which are important sources of financial institutions' profits.
Available data suggest that households' direct holdings of equities remain small by international standards, but are rising with efforts to promote private institutional saving. Households' aggregate net worth ranges from lows of 10 percent of GDP in some lowincome countries to in excess of 300 percent of GDP in higher-income countries. As a rule, only a small portion of this wealth is directly held in stocks, since households generally prefer relatively safe instruments such as bank deposits and government securities. 15 In India, almost three-quarters of household financial wealth is held in a combination of cash, bank deposits, and government securities (available data omit potentially important holdings of nonfinancial wealth, such as gold); in Japan the ratio is about 60 percent and in Korea about one-third. In contrast, households' direct holdings of shares generally account for less than 10 percent of household wealth. Taking indirect holdings via institutional investors into account, however, raises household exposure to equity to one-fifth to just over one-half of total household net worth, a figure that is sizable in relation to GDP in several countries. 2/ In Korea, foreign investors hold some 11.3 percent of GDP in Korean stocks. If these and the holdings of the government sector is included, total stock market assets in the economy is about 6 percent of GDP. While still moderate, rising equity holdings are making household wealth more sensitive to market movements. Direct equity holdings are over twice as volatile as holdings of deposits, reflecting swings in market valuation. 16 That said, indirect holdings via institutional investors are less volatile than direct stock holdings, perhaps reflecting restrictions on investments by institutional investors such as pension funds.
The financial sector's direct exposure to equity markets also appears relatively limited in Asia. With the exception of Taiwan Province of China, where domestic financial institutions 17 are net issuers of shares, direct holding of shares by financial institutions is relatively small, generally less than 10 percent of GDP and under 1 percent of total net assets. As such, financial institutions do not appear to be unduly vulnerable to direct losses arising from downward movements in the value of their stock holdings.
In sum, an equity market correction, in and of itself, would seem unlikely to have a major macroeconomic impact in Asia. Outside a few markets, valuations do not seem overly lofty. Moreover, available data suggest that households' and financial institutions' direct exposures to equity markets are generally modest. In addition, while equity markets play a growing role in corporate finance, Asian financial systems remain bank-dominated. That said, an equity market correction could be significant if it were triggered by broader macroeconomic or financial stress-say, slowing global growth, or widespread financial fragilities-and in turn would exacerbate the impact of such stress on Asian countries. Also, data on exposures are fragmentary, so overall conclusions should be treated as tentative. In addition, indirect exposures through institutional investors are nonnegligible and growing in some countries, and over time could increase households' exposure to asset-price cycles.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The growth and development of well-functioning equity markets conveys long-run economic benefits to Asia. It provides an efficient savings vehicle for retail and institutional investors, helping to diversify their financial holdings. Moreover, the increased diversity of funding sources for corporations can make Asian financial systems more robust to shocks. Davis 16 Because these calculations use aggregate data, volatility faced by individual households could well be higher. 17 Deposit money banks and other financial institutions, excluding pension and insurance funds. The aim of reaping the maximum benefit from the growth of equity markets, while managing the risks, has both microeconomic and macroeconomic policy implications. On the microeconomic side, the growing role of equity markets puts a premium on well-functioning market trading, clearing, and settlement systems, transparency, and corporate governance. Given that the technical infrastructure seems well-developed, a main challenge going forward may be expanding over time the capacity to handle a high volume of transactions (Ghosh, 2006) .
Low liquidity in some markets may reflect issues of transparency and corporate governance. These issues generate information asymmetries and the risk of adverse selection (when trading against better-informed investors), and accordingly foster high bid-asked spreads and limited trading activity. While de jure transparency and corporate governance have improved over time, investor perceptions suggest gaps in the application of existing frameworks.
The growth of equity markets also has potential implications for prudential regulation and supervision, which exist at the boundary of micro-and macro-financial stability. Appropriate regulation and supervision of institutions active in equity markets is essential for sound functioning of equity markets. Equally important is a firm understanding and strong management of equity exposures among financial institutions, so that equity-market volatility does not engender broader financial spillovers (see Korea's Financial Stability Report (October 2005) . For example, in financial systems where banks are active in stock markets, stress testing of equity market exposures-as done in the Monetary Authority of Singapore's Financial Stability Review (December 2005)-is important to limit the risk that an equity-market correction could create fragility in the banking system, potentially causing banks to rein in lending and giving rise to a credit crunch.
Another, more controversial macroeconomic policy question is whether-and if so, howmonetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations. For economies in emerging Asia, where the direct macroeconomic impact of stock prices may be limited, this could be largely a question for the future. Nevertheless, it is well agreed that equity prices are an important input to monetary policy decision making, because they reflect the market's assessment of future economic prospects. It is also relatively uncontroversial that current and past equity price developments may appropriately be factored into monetary policy, because such developments influence consumption and business investment through their effects on household wealth and the cost of capital.
Still actively debated is whether monetary policy should respond preemptively to the emergence of imbalances in equity and other financial markets. One school of thought contends that, especially in an environment of low inflationary pressures, accommodative monetary policy settings can feed financial imbalances (White, 2006) . The long-run buildup and sudden unwinding of such imbalances can seriously impair financial and macroeconomic stability. In addition, moral hazard could arise if central banks' mandates for macroeconomic (and sometimes financial) stability oblige them to ease in response to busts (Schinasi, 2006 , discusses the role of central banks in promoting financial stability). By this view, central banks have a motive-if not an obligation-to respond to such imbalances.
The more conventional school holds that monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to restrain financial imbalances-prudential policy is a better tool (Bernanke, 2002) . Even trying to do so could inflict major economic damage. Moreover, financial bubbles are too difficult to identify, even in hindsight. Accordingly, mistakenly tightening in response to a fundamentals-driven asset price boom (reflecting, say, productivity-enhancing technological innovation) could choke off potential growth. These considerations seem particularly relevant for Asian emerging markets countries, where structural changes complicate the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices, as well as between asset prices and economic activity. This would imply a reliance on prudential measures as a first line of defense against the macroeconomic effects of financial imbalances. While these issues will no doubt remain actively debated, the continued growth of financial markets will over time make them of increasing importance to policymakers. Most equity derivatives are exchange-traded (ETD), as opposed to foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives, which are mostly traded OTC. Formalized and regulated exchanges are leading the growth in Asian derivative markets, which can be divided into three categories: (i) fully demutualized exchanges (Hong Kong SAR and Singapore), which offer a wide range of derivative products; (ii) partially demutualized exchanges (Korea, India, and Malaysia), which have specialized in equity futures and index products; and (iii) derivative markets with no or marginal exchange-based trading and limited OTC derivative trading (China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand).
Equity derivatives markets are much less well-developed in other emerging Asian countries. In general, high levels of ETD tend to be associated with high equity trading in deep and sufficiently wide cash markets, mainly because the development of derivatives necessitates sufficient liquidity of cash markets (including pricing benchmarks) to ensure efficient price discovery. Since 2000, growth in overall derivative trading only in Korea, Hong Kong SAR, and Taiwan POC has outstripped growth of both domestic market capitalization and cash trading in equity markets (Tables I.2 and I.4) . 20 These countries currently exhibit high turnover ratios of almost 1½ to more than 36 times of outstanding stock, while average global turnover ratios of equity derivatives tend to converge to one (BIS, 2004; and WFE, 2005) . Since most of equity derivative contracts are traded in these countries, their high turnover ratio has kept aggregate equity derivative trading in emerging market Asia at more than 10 times GDP, stock market capitalization, and stock trading. Although stock exchanges in countries such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines also have strong trading activity in cash markets, similar to that in emerging market and mature market countries with established derivative markets, trading in equity derivatives remains very limited.
The notional amount of equity derivative contracts in Asia tends to be smaller than in the rest of the world, which might explain an even greater share of Asian markets in global turnover in terms of the number of contracts traded (although equity derivative trading in all of Asia has been associated with greater contract volumes over the years (Table I. The strong development of equity derivatives in Korea and India reflects a robust operational and legal infrastructure (Fratzscher, 2006) . For example, both countries have well-designed trading platforms, which provide access to both domestic and foreign institutional investors. By comparison, countries that are lagging have (for example) weak trading infrastructures, shortcomings in relevant laws that create uncertainty about whether derivatives contracts can be enforced (or even whether trading derivatives is permitted), tax provisions that are unfriendly to derivatives, bans on short selling, and restrictions on investment by foreigners.
Reaping the full benefits of equity derivatives markets by fostering their wider development also requires careful management of risks to financial stability. In Asian countries without formal derivative exchanges, the rising popularity of OTC derivatives entails greater emphasis on disclosure and transparency, good governance and risk management. Systemic risk is potentially reduced when trading occurs in well-structured and formally regulated exchanges that impose appropriate margin requirements and position limits, administer centralized clearing and settlement, engage in market surveillance, undertake adequate disclosure, and mutualize risks through loss-sharing arrangements, capital deposits of members, and international excess-of-loss insurance. 21 It is also reduced when supervisors and regulators can ascertain the exposure of systemically important financial institutions to derivatives markets. Sizable retail trading of derivatives may pose its own challenges and could (in principle) entail significant knock-on effects on real sectors; for example, a market downturn that inflicted widespread losses on households could affect confidence and spending. A good understanding of all these issues is incumbent on country officials charged with safeguarding financial stability. 1,281,344.6 2,638,514.7 4,088,498.7 5,451,717.6 5,718,696.9 6,251,042.6 4,454,458 
